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Abstract Using textual analysis for a large sample of analyst reports, we find that analysts are 
more likely to use DCF model than PE model and engage in more cash flow and discount rate 
discussions when investors have a stronger demand for value-relevant information. The market 
reactions to analyst investment opinions based on DCF model are stronger than those based on 
PE model, especially when the DCF model is accompanied by more cash flow and discount rate 
discussions. These results indicate that analysts’ valuation process reflects investor demand for 
value-relevant information and has a bearing on the quality of their research. 
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1. Introduction  
Despite a large literature on sell-side analyst forecasts, little is known about the valuation process 
through which analysts convert their earnings and various other accounting item forecasts into 
target prices and stock recommendations. Since analysts’ valuation process is not directly 
observable, a few studies attempt to infer how analysts covert their earnings forecasts into 
investment opinions by correlating recommendations and target prices with the implied estimates 
from some predefined valuation models.
1
 Bradshaw (2004) pioneered this line of research by 
showing that analysts give up using their earnings forecasts in developing stock recommendations, 
even though recommendations based on earnings forecast valuations relate positively to future 
stock returns. We use textual analysis for a large sample of analyst reports — the footprint of 
analyst research — to examine the determinants and the informativeness of analyst valuation 
models.  
We explore three closely related questions. We first examine whether investor demand for 
value-relevant information drives analysts’ use of discounted cash flow (DCF) model instead of 
price-to-earnings (PE) model
2
. We then examine whether analysts respond to investor demand for 
more value-relevant information by providing more cash flow and discount rate analysis, the two 
major inputs into the DCF valuation. Finally, we examine whether investors react differently to 
analyst investment opinions based on different valuation models.   
Our research is important as existing studies on analyst valuation process are subject to a 
few limitations. First, valuation models identified through model-based inference may deviate 
from the ones actually used by analysts, as a minor change in model assumptions may cause a 
large difference in the value estimates (Lundholm and O'keefe 2001). Second, the literature 
mainly examines earnings-based valuation models such as price-earnings-to-growth (PEG) and 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, Bradshaw (2004); Barniv et al. (2009), and Gleason et al. (2013).  
2
 We define PE model loosely which includes all the earnings multiples such as P/E, PEG, P/EBITDA, 
EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT, EV/EBITA, EBITDA/MV, and EV/EBIAT. 
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residual income valuation model (RIM) but neglect cash flow models, ranked as the second most 
important model used by analysts (Brown et al. 2015). Third, the context for the analysts’ choice 
of specific valuation models is still unclear. Theoretic models indicate that different valuation 
models lead to the same valuation if properly implemented. Thus, it is crucial to identify the 
context and the limitation for the use of a specific model. Finally, due to the lack of data, previous 
studies provide limited evidence on analyst assessment of valuation details. Asquith, Mikhail, and 
Au (2005) and Huang, Zang, and Zheng(2014) are among the very few examining the textual 
information discussed in analyst reports. They find that textual discussionsprovide incremental 
information to investors. They, however, do not consider analyst discussions of valuation details, 
the cash flow and discount rate information in particular.  
Based on a textual analysis for a sample of 527,883 financial analyst reports during 1997 to 
2015 on 4,957 U.S. firms by 3,196 analysts, we identify the dominant valuation models used by 
analysts to justify their stock recommendations and target prices. We examine whether investor 
demand for the underlying firms’ value-relevant information affects analysts’ use of valuation 
models. Chen et al. (2013) decompose stock price movement into two components: the change 
due to cash flow news revisions and the change due to discount rate news revisions. They 
conclude that both cash flow news and discount rate news contribute to stock price movement. 
Following this decomposition of stock returns, we expect that the processing of cash flow 
information and discount rate information be crucial for analysts’ valuation process.  
Compared with PE model that assumes earnings is proportional to firm value and implies 
risk assessment in the estimate of P/E ratio, DCF model speaks directly into multi-period cash 
flow forecasts and the discount rate estimate. Since it is more difficult for investors to interpret, 
evaluate, and verify less precise information, specific information is more valuable to investors’ 
decisions makings (See Heinle and Smith 2017; Hope et al. 2016). Therefore, we expect investors 
to value the specific cash flow and discount rate information conveyed through DCF valuation 
process, especially when they have a stronger demand for such information. As Brown et al. 
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(2015) find that client demand for information is the most important determinant of analysts’ 
coverage decisions, investor demand for cash flow and discount rate information about the 
underlying firms has a bearing on analysts’ valuation process through their application of DCF 
model. 
 We use earnings quality and firm risks to capture the extent of investor demand for cash 
flow and discount rate information, respectively.  We find that analysts are more likely to use 
DCF model than PE model to value firms with lower earnings quality measured by earnings 
management and total accrual, and firms with higher risks measured by operational cash flow 
volatility, negative earnings, and stock return volatility. To further examine the impact of investor 
demand for discount rate information on analysts’ valuation model choice, we attempt to control 
for investor demand for cash flow information by comparing DCF with price-to-cash flows (PCF) 
models. Both models rely on the input of cash flow forecasts. DCF model entails, however, an 
additional input of discount rate which largely reflects the underlying firm risks. We find that the 
likelihood for analysts to use DCF over P/CF model is not related to earnings quality, but is 
positively associated with firm risks. Overall, we find that the investor demand for cash flow and 
discount rate information influence analysts’ valuation model decisions. 
We then examine whether investor demand for value-relevant information relates to analyst 
processing of such information. While investor demand for cash flow and discount rate 
information may motivate analysts to use DCF model to value the underlying firms, the actual 
processing of such information may be subject to various constraints, such as the ease with which 
to collect the information, resources available to the analyst, and the cost-benefit analysis of such 
information collection. To rule out the possibility that DCF analysis is just a label, we resort to 
textual analysis of analyst reports to capture analysts’ processing of cash flow and discount rate 
information. To the extent that analysts use DCF model in response to investor demand for cash 
flow and discount rate information, we expect to find analysts make more cash flow and discount 
rate discussions in their research reports when investors have stronger demand for such 
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information. Consistent with our predictions, we find strong support that analysts indeed make 
more cash flow analysis for firms with lower earnings quality, and more discount rate analysis for 
firms with higher risks.  
Finally, we examine whether the informativeness of analyst investment opinions varies 
with the underlying valuation models. We use market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns 
within 3 days, 30 days, half a year and one year after the forecast date to capture the 
informativeness of analyst research. We find that market reactions to the analyst buy 
recommendations and target price changes based on DCF model are stronger than those based on 
PE model. Further analysis indicates that the differences in market reactions are more pronounced 
when analysts engage in more cash flow and discount rate discussions.  
In further analysis, we find that the impact of investor demand on the use of DCF model 
and the discussions of valuation inputs is strengthened when the economic policy uncertain is 
high and is attenuated when the market sentiment is high. Our main findings remain qualitatively 
unchanged when we replace DCF model with absolute models which include DCF and other 
discount-rate based intrinsic valuation models, and replace PE model with multiple-based relative 
models using various accounting items. Our findings are robust to alternative proxies for analyst 
valuation details and alternative subsample. 
Our paper is most closely related to Asquith et al. (2005) and Demirakos, Strong, and 
Walker (2010). Asquith et al. (2005) catalog the content of 1,126 reports by 56 star analysts from 
1997 to 1999. Their sample shows that almost all reports use an earnings multiple, while only 9.5% 
of the reports use DCF model. They find that short-term market reaction is related to target prices 
and analyst’s textual justifications, but not to valuation methodology. Demirakos et al. (2010) 
examine 490 equity research reports for 94 UK-listed firms from 2002 to 2004. They find weak 
evidence that DCF model outperforms PE model in target price accuracy. Our sample covers a 
much longer period with a larger sample: there are 527,883 reports on 4,957 U.S. firms during 
1997 to 2015 issued by 3,196 analysts. The larger sample size contributes to the power of tests 
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and the generalizability of our results. More importantly, based on the theoretical motivation for 
the value drivers, we find consistent evidence that investor demand for cash flow and discount 
rate information contributes to analysts’ supply of such value-relevant information, which 
facilitates their use of DCF model. Our study contributes to a better understanding of the 
valuation “black box” called for by Bradshaw (2009).  
Our study also extends the study by DeFond and Hung (2003, 2007) who find that analysts 
tend to make cash flow forecasts when investors demand cash flows to interpret earnings 
information. Since both cash flow and discount rate information drive the stock price movement, 
following the logic of DeFond and Hung (2003, 2007), we expect and find that investor demand 
for value-relevant information motivate analysts to provide more cash flow and discount rate 
information in their valuation process.  
Our study adds to the literature on analysts’ assessment of firm risks. Lui et al. (2007) is 
the first to examine analysts’ risk assessment by using analyst risk ratings from Salomon Smith 
Barney and Citigroup during 1997-2003. They find that analysts’ risk ratings are largely 
explained by firm traits such as size, book-to-market, leverage, earnings quality, losses and 
idiosyncratic risks. A follow up study by Joos et al. (2016) uses the spread in Morgan Stanley 
analysts’ scenario-based (bull and bear scenarios) valuations to capture analysts’ attitude towards 
firm risks and find that the spread relates positively to firm riskiness such as beta, small size, 
financial distress, losses and idiosyncratic risk. Our study extends analysts’ risk assessment to 
their valuation process. We find that analysts engage in more discount rate analysis, an overall 
assessment of firm risks by analysts, for firms with higher risks, especially during high 
uncertainty period when investors find discount rate information valuable to their decision-
makings. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework 
and our hypotheses. Section 3 describes data and model specifications. Section 4 conducts 
empirical analysis, and Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Theoretical Framework for Firm Valuation 
Our research question is centered on what drives analysts’ use of different models in firm 
valuation. To answer this question, we need to establish 1) what drives the stock price movement 
and 2) the relationship between valuation models and the value drivers. Chen et al. (2013) 
theorize that stock prices move because of the revisions in expected cash flows and discount rates. 
They decompose stock returns into “Cash Flow News” due to cash flow information change and 
“Discount Rate News” due to discount rates change, and find that both components contribute to 
stock returns.
 3
 A major task for financial analysts is to provide target price forecasts and stock 
recommendations that reflect their expectations of the underlying firms’ future stock prices, 
usually during a horizon of six to 12 months.  
Theoretically, both PE and DCF model incorporate analysts’ expectations of the underlying 
firm’s cash flows and discount rates. In the PE model valuation process, the firm value is 
estimated by multiplying the earnings forecasts of the underlying firm with the P/E ratio of the 
comparable firms or the firm’s own historical value. PE model implicitly conveys analysts’ 
expected cash flows and discount rates assessment as follows. First, since stock prices respond to 
analyst earnings forecast revisions (Griffin 1976; Francis and Soffer 1997; Park and Stice 2000), 
earnings forecasts capture the marginal investors’ expectation of future cash flows. Chen et al. 
(2013) use analyst earnings forecasts to capture cash flows news in stock return decomposition. 
Second, the choice of comparable firms and the use of P/E ratios reflect analysts’ implicit risk 
assessment of the underlying firms. Comparable firms are chosen because they have future cash 
flow expectations proportional and risks similar to the underlying firms. In contrast, DCF model 
                                                          
3
 The decomposition of stock returns into cash flow news and discount rate news is well documented in 
the finance literature, such as Campbell and Ammer (1993), Campbell and Shiller (1988), Campbell and 
Vuolteenaho (2004), Chen and Zhao (2009),  and Bansal and Yaron (2004). 
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relies explicitly on multi-period cash flow forecasts and specific discount rates estimates for the 
underlying firms.  
In practice, the efficiency of PE and DCF models in firm valuation depends on the 
appropriateness of the underlying assumptions. PE model valuation relies on two major 
assumptions: earnings are proportional to the firm value, and comparable firms are properly 
selected. In contrast, the usefulness of DCF model valuation depends on the assumptions that 
cash flows are proportional to the firm value, and discount rates are reliably estimated. Overall, 
both PE and DCF models have inherent limitations. Thus it is important to identify the contexts in 
which DCF model outperforms PE model, or vice versa, in analysts’ firm valuation.  
Based on the decomposition of stock returns in Chen et al. (2013), we explore whether 
analysts’ tendency to use DCF model over PE model varies with investor demand for cash flow 
and discount rate information. Compared with PE model, DCF model provides direct cash flow 
forecasts and explicitly assesses firm risks through the discount rate estimates. We thus expect to 
find analysts more likely to use DCF than PE model when investors have stronger demand for 
cash flow and discount rate information. It is possible that analysts respond to investor demand by 
simply adopting the label of DCF model without providing any incremental valuation information 
in the report. To address this concern, we investigate whether analysts engage in more cash flow 
and discount rate discussions (the two major valuation inputs into DCF model) in their research 
report when investors have stronger demand for such information. Finally, we examine whether 
investors respond differently to analysts’ investment opinions justified by different valuation 
models. Our ultimate goal is to investigate the impact of investor demand for value-relevant 
information on the analyst valuation process. 
9 
 
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
2.2.1 Investor demand for cash flow and discount rate information and analysts’ use of DCF 
model  
Our discussion in Section 2.1 suggests that analysts’ tendency to use DCF over PE model 
may vary with investor demand for cash flow and discount rate information. We elaborate how 
earnings quality affects investor demand for cash flow information, and firm risks for discount 
rate information, and how such investor demand for value-relevant information facilitates 
analysts’ use of DCF model.  
 While some studies find that earnings are superior to cash flows in firm valuation 
(Dechow 1994; Dechow et al. 1998; Liu et al 2002; Penman and Yehuda 2009), other studies 
show that cash flows provide incremental information relative to that contained in earnings, 
especially when earnings quality is low (Bowen et al. 1987; DeFond and Hung 2007). Defond 
and Hung (2003) find that investor demand for cash flow information increases for firms whose 
earnings are likely to contain material misstatements, which are less likely to reflect the 
underlying economic activities. To the extent that low earnings quality adversely impacts the 
usefulness of PE model, we expect to find that investor demand for cash flow information would 
motivate analysts to use DCF model which relies crucially on thorough cash flow analysis. When 
analysts provide cash flow information, they implicitly provide investors their interpretation of 
the total operating accruals, which help investors to sort out the inferior part of earnings (McInnis 
and Collins 2011).  
We expect investor demand for discount rate information to be stronger for firms with 
higher risks. This is because possible outcomes are more extreme and consequently have 
potentially greater impact on stock price for riskier firms. While PE model implies analysts’ risk 
assessment and discount rate estimate through the selection of comparable firms and the use of 
10 
 
P/E ratios, analysts usually conduct thorough risk analysis to derive specific discount rate 
estimates in the DCF analysis.  
Existing studies show that specific information is more valuable to investors, as less 
precise information is likely more difficult for investors to interpret, evaluate and verify (Bozanic 
et al. 2013). Heinle and Smith (2017) present a model of risk disclosures and conclude that more 
precise disclosures imply greater information content and investor attention. Hope et al. (2016) 
quantify the level of specificity of risk disclosures in the 10-K fillings and find it increases the 
market reaction to the 10-k fillings. In addition, they find that specific risk disclosures enhance 
analysts’ reliability in assessing firm risks. Therefore, we predict that investor demand for 
discount rate information for riskier firms motivate analysts to incorporate their discount rate 
assessment into the valuation process by using DCF model. 
We note that the relation between analysts’ tendency to use DCF model and firms’ 
earnings quality and riskiness is not warranted for at least two reasons. First, analyst cash flow 
forecasts used in DCF model may not be informative to investors, which will reduce the 
usefulness of DCF model. Although research on analyst cash flow forecasts generally suggests 
cash flow forecasts provide incremental information to investors (DeFond and Hung 2003, 2007; 
Call et al. 2013), Givoly et al. (2009) claim that analyst cash flow forecasts are naïve extension of 
earnings forecasts by simply adding depreciation and amortization expenses back to earnings 
forecasts. If analyst cash flow forecasts do not provide additional information to earnings, the 
argument that investor demand for cash flow information from analysts for low earnings quality 
firms will not hold. Second, an increase in risk and uncertainty makes it tougher to implement the 
DCF valuation. Analysts need to spend extra efforts to forecast the valuation inputs into DCF 
model for riskier firms. The increased complexity and uncertainty may weaken analysts’ 
incentives to respond to investor demand by using DCF model. 
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Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether analysts are more likely to use DCF model 
for firms with lower earnings quality and higher risks. Our first hypothesis in an alternative form 
is as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: Analysts are more likely to use DCF model than PE model to value firms with 
lower earnings quality and higher risks. 
2.2.2 Investor demand and analysts’ assessment of cash flow and discount rate information  
While we expect investor demand for value-relevant information motivates analysts to use 
DCF model, the actual processing of cash flow and discount rate information may be subject to 
various constraints, such as the ease with which to collect the information, resources available to 
the analyst for information collection, and the cost-benefit analysis of such information collection. 
Opportunistic analysts might respond to investor demand by simply mentioning the application of 
DCF model or using DCF model but without much analysis into underlying cash flows and 
discount rates. To rule out the possibility that DCF is a label or cheap talk, we further examine 
whether investor demand for value-relevant information motivates analysts’ actual processing of 
DCF valuation inputs: the cash flow and the discount rate assessment. 
DeFond and Hung (2003, 2007) find that analysts are more likely to provide cash flow 
forecasts for firms whose earnings are likely to be subject to misstatement. Lui et al. (2007) and 
Joos et al. (2016) show that analysts’ risk assessment largely reflect firm characteristics. To the 
extent that analysts are more likely to use DCF model to satisfy investor demand for value-
relevant information and to the extent that the application of DCF model is justified by thorough 
cash flow and discount rate analysis, we predict that analysts make more cash flow and discount 
rate discussions for firms with lower earnings quality and higher risks respectively.  
Taken together, we expect that investor demand for cash flow and discount rate 
information motivates analysts to engage in more such information analysis, which finally 
facilitates analysts’ use of DCF valuation model. Our second hypothesis is stated in an alternative 
form as follows.  
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Hypothesis 2: Analysts engage in more cash flow discussions for firms with lower earnings 
quality, and more discount rate discussions for firms with higher risks. 
2.2.3 The informativeness of using DCF model   
We expect that investors will find analyst investment opinions justified by DCF model 
more informative relative to those based on PE model. First of all, as stated in H1 and H2, DCF 
model incorporates additional insights into cash flow and discount rate information which are 
valuable to investors.  In addition, DeFranco et al. (2015) find that analysts tend to choose firms 
with high valuations as peer companies when using relative valuation models. This suggests that 
the estimate of P/E ratio used in PE model is subject to bias, making PE model less informative 
compared with DCF model. We investigate the informativeness of analyst investment opinions by 
examining the market reactions differences to analyst recommendations and target price changes 
based on DCF model and PE model.  
Given the concern that analysts’ application of DCF valuation models could be only a label, 
and do not incorporate much analysis into the underlying firms’ cash flows and discount rates. 
We predict that DCF models accompanied with more cash flows and discount rates discussions 
are more informative to investors. In other words, the differences in market reactions to analyst 
investment opinions justified by DCF model and PE model are more pronounced when analysts 
engage in more cash flows and discount rates discussions. 
The above discussion leads to our last hypothesis on the informativeness of valuation 
models as follows. 
Hypothesis 3: The market reactions to analyst investment opinions based on DCF model are 
stronger than those based on PE model, especially when DCF model is accompanied by more 
cash flows and discount rates discussions. 
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3. Data and Model Specifications 
3.1 Sample Selection 
We retrieve sell-side analyst reports from eight of the top 15 banks in terms of the number 
of analyst reports available from Investext during 1997 to 2015. We develop a Java program to 
parse each analyst report to extract the following information: report number, name of the analyst 
and the brokerage firm, name and trading symbol of the covered company, analyst CFA 
designation, and stock recommendations, target price forecasts, textual description on valuation 
process including models, cash flow, discount rate and risk, and total number of words. 
We have 676,651 analyst reports from Investext matched to the I/B/E/S, CRSP and 
Compustat. We delete reports without the disclosure of valuation models and with missing values 
of variables used in our study. Finally, we restrict our sample to analyst reports which include 
either DCF or PE as the dominant valuation model. To obtain analyst traits such as their working 
experience and coverage portfolio, we match Investext reports to the I/B/E/S U.S. database by 
brokerage firm names, analyst names and the underlying company identifiers that include trading 
symbols and company names. To ensure matching accuracy, we require the forecast dates in the 
Investext reports fall between the recommendation forecast announcement dates and review dates 
from the I/B/E/S. We obtain daily stock prices and returns from CRSP, and financial data from 
Compustat. We adjust for the discrepancies in the underlying currency among CRSP, the I/B/E/S 
and Investext by using daily exchange rates from Compustat. Our final sample consists of 
527,883 reports on 4,957 U.S. firms from Investext from 1997 to 2015 issued by 3,196 analysts. 
Appendix A describes our sample selection process. 
3.2 Procedures to Identify Valuation Models  
We apply the following procedures to identify the dominant valuation models in analyst 
reports. We first randomly select 20,000 sentences from more than 10 million sentences extracted 
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from the cover pages of nearly half a million of analyst reports from the eight banks. We then 
assign each sentence to at least two research assistants to detect whether a valuation model is 
explicitly or implicitly used. We end up with around 1,700 sentences that indicate the use of a 
valuation model. From these sentences, we parse the text of a report to identify the use of a 
valuation model. We use a keyword search for those sentences that include the use of a valuation 
model to detect which model is used. The keywords include accounting items that we extract 
from the sentences that our RAs have flagged for the use of a valuation model and are 
supplemented with terms from previous studies that indicate the use of a valuation model, such as 
Gordon Growth model and Enterprise Value Multiple.  
Analysts usually mention multiple valuation models in a given report. To identify the 
dominant models in a report, we search for two sets of keywords that suggest the analyst is 
relying on a specific model to justify the stock recommendation and/or the target price. The first 
set of keywords relates to the research outputs of target price and recommendation, which 
includes the following keywords: price target, target price, PT, recommend, and 
recommendation. The second set of keywords relates to an analyst’s action of applying a specific 
valuation model to justify target price and recommendation, including use, using, based, basing, 
derive, derived, rating, and rate. In the same sentence that contains a valuation model pattern, if it 
also contains any of the research output or action keywords listed above, then the valuation model 
is regarded as the dominant model.  If the scheme based on the above two sets of keywords does 
not reveal any dominant models in a report, then valuation models with a frequency of at least 3/4 
of the most frequently used models in the report are considered as dominant models. We describe 
the procedure of defining dominant methods in Appendix C in detail. 
Following Gleason et al. (2013) we classify the valuation models into two broad categories: 
relative valuation models such as price-to-earnings (PE), price-to-book value (PB), price-to-sales 
(PSAL), and price-to-cash flows (PCF) that are compared with comparable peers to develop a 
relative value of the underlying company; and absolute valuation models such as DCF and RIM 
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that combine future cash flow forecasts or earnings forecasts with estimated discount rates. Based 
on the frequency distribution of valuation models from the reports and prior studies, we classify 
five models under the relative valuation category, including multiples based on earnings, sales, 
book value, cash flow, and others. Under the absolute valuation category, we include models that 
are cash flow-based, accrual-based and other types. Please refer to Appendix B for these 
valuation model classifications and the major accounting items that we use to identify each model. 
Our focus is on the comparison between PE model and DCF model as they are 
representative of relative and absolute models, respectively. In addition, PE model and DCF 
model are the most frequently used valuation models by analysts (Imam et al. 2013; Brown et al. 
2015).  
3.3 Model Specifications 
We test H1 on the determinants of using DCF model by estimating the following logistic 
regression model: 
           𝐷𝐶𝐹 = 𝜕1 + 𝜕2𝐸𝑄 + 𝜕3𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 +  𝜕4 ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜕5𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜕6𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 + 𝜕7𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
+ 𝜀   (1) 
Where DCF is a dummy equal to one if the dominant valuation model is DCF model, and 
zero if the dominant model is PE model. EQ denotes proxies for the demand for cash flow 
information. We use the abnormal accruals based on Modified Jones Model (Earnmgmt) and the 
absolute difference between net income before extraordinary items and operating cash flows 
divided by total assets (Accrual) to capture investor demand for cash flow information. Risk 
denotes proxies for investor demand for discount rate information, measured with the following 
three firm risk traits: the standard deviation of quarterly operating cash flows during the past five 
years (CF_std), Loss, an indicator of negative earnings and Retstd12, 12 months Standard 
deviation of daily stock return before analyst report date.  
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We test H2 on the impact of investor demand on analyst cash flow and discount rate 
discussions by estimating the following OLS regression models. 
         𝑅𝑒𝑝𝐶𝐹 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝐸𝑄 + 𝛼3 ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝛼4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛼5𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 + 𝛼6𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀   (2𝑎) 
           𝑅𝑒𝑝𝐷𝑅 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 +  𝛽3 ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝛽4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀  (2𝑏) 
We measure analyst cash flow discussions in their reports with the number of cash flow 
keywords (RepCF), and analyst discount rate discussions with the number of discount rate 
keywords (RepDR).  
We test H3 on the informativeness of valuation models by estimating the following OLS 
regression models.  
     𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 + 𝛾3𝐷𝐶𝐹 + 𝛾4𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 ∗ 𝐷𝐶𝐹 +  𝛾5 ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝛾6𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟
+ 𝛾7𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 + 𝛾8𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀 (3) 
Where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 is market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return starting one day before to t 
days after the issuance of an analyst report. Signal indicates analyst investment opinions. We use 
Buy and Sell, the indicators of analyst recommendation types to measure the recommendation 
opinions and use TPchg, the change of analyst target price forecast scaled by the stock price at the 
beginning of the year, to measure the target price opinions. We test whether the informativeness 
of DCF model varies with the extent of analyst cash flow and discount rate discussions by 
partitioning the sample into high and low subsamples according to the yearly median values of 
RepCF and RepDR. We then test whether there is a difference in 𝛾4 between the high and low 
subsamples. 
Controls refer to a vector of firm,analyst and report characteristics. The firm characteristics 
include firm size (Logmv), sales growth (Salesgrowth), systematic risk (Beta), and stock return 
(Arpre12). The analyst and report characteristics include the total number of an analyst report 
words (Repword), industry expertise (Indexport), firm experience (Firmex), recommendation type 
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(Buy), and CFA designation (CFA). We also control for year, bank, and industry fixed effects. 
Appendix D shows the variable definitions in detail. The standard errors are adjusted for firm and 
year clustering. 
3.4 Descriptive Statistics  
  Table 1 Panel A shows the yearly distribution of the key variables. We find that on 
average 19% of the analyst reports use DCF as the dominant valuation models to justify 
recommendations and/or target prices
4
.  The popularity of DCF model has increased over years, 
with an increase from 3% in 1997 to more than 21% in recent years
5
. Given the variations of DCF 
model over years, we include year fixed effects in all estimations. In addition, we show that on 
average each analyst report has three words on cash flow analysis and one word on discount rate 
analysis.  
Panel B of Table 1 presents the total number of analyst reports, firms and analysts by 
Fama-French 12 digit sectors, along with the proportion of using DCF model. Panel B indicates 
that there is a considerable variation in the proportions of analyst reports using DCF model across 
industries. For example, while analysts use DCF model for 43 % of their reports to evaluate firms 
from Telephone and Television Transmission industry, they only use DCF model for 9% of their 
reports to evaluate firms from the Manufacturing industry. In addition, Panel B shows that the 
proportion of firms being valued with DCF model and the proportion of analysts using DCF 
model are the highest in Utilities and Telephone and Television Transmission. Given the variation, 
we include industry fixed effects in all estimations. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
                                                          
4
 In unreported table, we find that 54% of analysts and 55% of firms have ever used DCF model as the 
dominant model during the sample period 
5
 We observe a similar increasing trend of firms valued with (an increase from 6 % in 1997 to 52% in 
2015) and analysts using DCF model (an increase from 11% in 1997 to 58% in 2015). 
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Table 2 Panel A describes the summary statistics of key variables used in our study. The 
average earnings management is 0.062, and the total accrual is 0.071. For firm risks, it shows that 
firm operation cash flow volatility is 0.058, and 18% firms experience negative earnings. In 
addition, the average stock return standard deviation 12 months before the report date is 2.39. 63% 
of analyst reports include cash flow keywords, and 49% of analyst reports include discount rate 
keywords. 
Table 2 Panel B presents the Pearson correlation analysis of our key variables. The table 
shows that DCF indicator is positively associated with poor earnings quality and high firm risks 
(except for Retstd12). Moreover, it suggests that analyst cash flow and discount rate discussions 
are positively related to their tendency to use DCF model. We note that the variables within 
earnings quality and firm risk categories are highly correlated. For example, the correlation 
between Earnmgmt and Accrual is 0.644, and the correlations among CF_std, Loss, and Retstd12 
are between 0.353 and 0.420. The high correlations suggest that there might be multicollinearity 
issues when we pool these variables into one regression. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
4. Empirical Analyses 
4.1 Investor Demand for Cash Flow and Discount Rate Information and the Use of DCF 
Model 
Table 3 reports the logistic regressions on the determinants of using DCF model. The 
dependent variable is DCF equal to one if the dominant valuation model in a report is DCF model, 
and zero otherwise. Column (1) to (2) tests the impact of investor demand for cash flow 
information on analyst tendency to use DCF model. We find significantly positive coefficients on 
Earnmgmt and Accrual , indicating that analysts are more likely to use DCF model for firms with 
lower earnings quality. 
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Column (3) to (5) tests the impact of investor demand for discount rate information on 
analyst tendency to use DCF model. We find significantly positive coefficients on CF_std, Loss, 
and Retstd12. The findings indicate that analysts are more likely to use DCF model to value firms 
with higher risks.  In column (6), we pool all the earnings quality and firm risks variables in a 
regress and the results are qualitatively unchanged. Taken together, we show that analysts tend to 
use DCF model in response to investor demand for firm’s cash flow and discount rate information.  
For control variables, we find that analysts tend to use DCF model to value growth firms as 
proxied by Salesgrowth, consistent with the findings in Demirakos et al. (2010). The significant 
and positive coefficients on analyst report length (Repwords) suggest that DCF analysis involves 
more detailed information provided by analysts. We also find some evidence that analysts tend to 
use DCF model to justify their buy recommendations. This may be because investors think 
analysts’ buy recommendations are subject to optimistic bias, analysts thus use DCF model to 
increase the credibility of their favorable recommendations. In addition, we find that the tendency 
to use DCF model is negatively associated with beta. We also find that analysts with more 
industry and firm coverage experience are less likely to use DCF model. This is because rich 
experiences could aid analysts to make efficient judgments in the PE valuation process, such as 
choosing appropriate peer firms and estimating P/E ratios, which will reduce the usefulness of 
DCF model over PE model. We find insignificant coefficients on Arpre12 and CFA, suggesting 
that the likelihood of using DCF model is not associated with the underlying firm’s past 
performance and the analyst CFA designation. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4.2 Investor Demand and Analysts’ Discussions on Cash Flow and Discount Rate 
Information 
Table 4 reports regression results on the impact of investor demand for value-relevant 
information on analysts processing of cash flow and discount rate information. Column (1) to (2) 
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tests the impact of firm earnings quality on the number of analyst cash flow discussions in their 
reports. We document significantly positive coefficients on Earnmgmt and Accrual, suggesting 
that analysts engage in more cash flow discussions for firms with lower earnings quality.  
Column (3) to (5) tests the impact of firm risks on the number of analyst discount rate 
discussions in their reports. The coefficients on three risk variables: CF_std, Loss, and Retstd12 
are significantly positive, indicating that analysts engage in more discount rate discussions for 
firms with higher risks. Taken together, Table 4 suggests that analysts’ use of DCF model is not a 
label, but incorporating detailed cash flow and discount rate discussions when investors have 
stronger demand for such information. Our H2 is supported. 
For control variables, we find that analyst processing of cash flow and discount rates is 
positively associated with firm growth rate (Salesgrowth), past abnormal return (Arpre12), the 
length of analyst reports (Repwords), and the issuance of buy recommendations (Buy). We also 
document that analysts make fewer cash flow and discount rate discussions for firms with larger 
size (Logmv) and higher beta (Beta) and when analysts have richer industry (Indexpert) and firm 
coverage experiences (Firmexp). We find no significant evidence that analysts’ CFA designation 
has an effect on their processing of value-relevant information. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.3 Robustness Tests 
4.3.1 Cross-sectional analysis on investor demand for DCF model 
Table 5 Panel A reports the impact of economic policy uncertainty on investor demand for 
DCF valuation model. Loh and Stulz (2018) find that analyst research is more valuable in bad 
times since investors rely more on analysts in bad times. Similarly, we expect that investor 
demand for analyst using DCF model is stronger when the economic policy uncertainty is higher. 
Using the data from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), we use EPU to proxy for the economic 
policy uncertainty.  
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Column (1) to (5) tests the impact of EPU on the positive relation between investor demand 
for value-relevant information and analyst tendency to use DCF model. To test the incremental 
effect under high EPU, we interact EPU with investor demand for cash flow and risk variables. 
For simplicity, we put investor demand variables on the top of regressions and use the label Trait 
to stand for Earnmgmt, Accrual, CF_std, Loss, and Retstd12 respectively from column (1) to (5). 
We find significantly positive coefficients on the interaction item EPU*Trait, suggesting that 
high economic policy uncertainty strengthens the effect of investor demand for cash flow and 
discount rate information on analysts’ tendency to use DCF model.  
Column (6) to (10) tests the impact of EPU on the positive relation between investor 
demand for value-relevant information and analyst processing of such information. The 
independent variables are the same as in column (1) to (5). The dependent variable is RepCF in 
column (6) to (7), and RepDR in column (8) to (10).  The coefficients on the interactions of 
EPU*Trait  are significantly positive, suggesting that analysts engage in more cash flow 
discussions and discount rate discussions in response to investor demand for such information 
when the economic policy uncertainty is high. The results in Panel A Table 5 provide 
corroborating evidence that investor demand for value-relevant information has an impact on 
analyst valuation process. 
Table 5 Panel B reports the impact of market sentiment on investor demand for DCF model. 
As PE model incorporates the market sentiment in the estimate of P/E ratio, we expect that 
investor demand for DCF model is weakened when the market is hot.  We use Sentiment, the 
University of Michigan consumer sentiment index, to capture the market sentiment. We then 
repeat the analyses in Panel A by replacing EPU with Sentiment. The results are reported in Panel 
B.  We find significantly negative coefficients on Sentiment*Trait (8 out of the10 regressions), 
suggesting that investor demand for analysts using DCF model and discussing cash flow and 
discount rate information is attenuated when the market sentiment is high.  
 [Insert Table 5 here] 
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4.3.2 Compare absolute model with relative model 
In the discussion above, we only consider and compare analysts’ use of DCF model and PE 
model. Table 6 considers all the valuation models used by analysts in their reports. Following 
Gleason et al. (2013), we classify valuation models into absolute and relative valuation models
6
. 
As we include all the valuation models, the sample size used in this section is larger than that 
used in the main analyses. The sample consists of 577,772 analyst reports with 122,647 reports 
using absolute valuation models and 457,934 reports using relative valuation models
7
.   
Panel A in Table 6 reports the distribution of the major valuation models with an average 
of at least 3% used by analysts in their reports. We observe that DCF model and PE model are the 
most frequently used models under the absolute and relative model category, one of the reasons 
why we focus on the comparison between DCF and PE model. Except for DCF model, another 
frequently used absolute model is NAV model with an average of 4% analyst reports usage. We 
find that the use of RIM model is almost zero in our sample (not reported in the table), suggesting 
that prior studies assuming RIM model to be the legitimate way that analysts use their earnings 
forecasts for recommendations did not capture the actual use of valuation models by analysts. In 
addition, the small proportion of RIM used by analysts is consistent with Hand et al. (2017) who 
document that the use of RIM models is only 5% of the use of DCF models. Under the relative 
model category, we show that PB, PSAL, and PCF models are used by analysts with an average 
ratio of 4%, 3%, and 3%. Figure 1 shows the distributions of valuation models over years.  
Panel B in Table 6 shows the determinants of using absolute over relative models. The 
dependent variable Absolute is an indicator, which equals to one if the dominant valuation model 
is absolute model and zero if the dominant model is relative model. Investor demand for cash 
flow and discount rate information variables are the same as in Table 3. Consistent with the 
                                                          
6
 Please refer to appendix B for the specific valuation models under the absolute and relative model 
categories. 
7
 The reason that the sum of absolute and relative valuation models is larger than the full sample size is 
because analysts might use both absolute and relative models in one report to justify their recommendations 
and target prices. 
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findings in Table 3, we show that analysts are more likely to use absolute models to value firms 
with lower earnings quality and higher risks. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
4.3.3 Compare DCF with PCF model 
To further examine the impact of investor demand for discount rate information on analysts’ 
valuation model choice, we control for investor demand for cash flow information by comparing 
DCF with price-to-cash flows (PCF) models.  While both DCF and PCF models rely on the input 
of cash flow forecasts, DCF entails an additional input of discount rates which largely reflects the 
underlying firm’s risks. Given the major difference between DCF and PCF model lies in discount 
rate assessment, we expect that analysts’ tendency to use DCF over PCF model is positively 
related to investor demand for discount rate information, but not related to investor demand for 
cash flow information.  
Panel C in Table 6 reports the logit regressions on the likelihood of using DCF over PCF 
model. We have observations of 122,610 analyst reports, including 101,809 reports using DCF 
model and 20,801 reports using PCF model. The dependent variable DCF_PCF equals to one if 
the dominant valuation model is DCF and zero if the dominant model is PCF.  Column (1) to (2) 
shows that the coefficients on Earnmgmt and Accrual are not significant, suggesting that analysts’ 
tendency to use DCF over PCF model is not related to earnings quality. Both DCF and PCF 
models could satisfy investor demand for cash flow information for firms with lower earnings 
quality.  
Columns (3) to (5) show that DCF_PCF indicator is significantly positively associated 
with the three firm risk variables (CF_std, Loss, and Retstd12), suggesting that investor demand 
for discount rate information influence analysts’ choice between DCF and PCF model. The 
comparison between DCF and PCF model lends further support to our investor demand 
hypotheses on analysts’ choice of valuation models. 
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4.3.4 Compare pure DCF and pure PE model 
To eliminate the effect of the hybrid models for which an analyst report uses both DCF and 
PE as the dominant models, we construct a new variable PureDCF which equals one if an analyst 
report only uses DCF as the dominant model, and zero if it only uses PE as dominant model. 
After excluding analyst reports that use both DCF and PE model as the dominant models, we are 
left with 475,977 analyst reports, including 49,903 reports only using DCF as the dominant 
valuation model. In unreported tests, we find that analysts are more likely to use pure DCF model 
than pure PE model for firms with poorer earnings quality and higher risks.  
4.3.5 Alternative measurement of analyst cash flow and discount rate discussions 
 Analysts from different banks may have the boilerplates to write their research reports. As 
a result, analysts from certain banks may randomly mention cash flows and discount rates in their 
reports rather than intentionally discuss the information in response to investor demand.  We 
control for bank fixed effect to address this concern in the previous analyses. In this section, we 
further address this concern by ranking analyst cash flow and discount rate discussions for each 
bank-year in quintiles.  We thus have two new measurements: RepCF5d, the rank of RepCF by 
bank year, range from 1 to 5, and RepDR5d, the rank of RepDR by bank year, range from 1 to 5. 
           We use tobit regression to repeat the analyses in Table 4. Table 7 reports the results. 
Consistent with the findings documented in Table 4, we find that the quintile ranks of RepCF and 
RepDR are also significantly positively related to poor earnings quality variables and high firm 
risk variables (except for Retstd12) respectively. Overall, our main findings are qualitatively 
unchanged. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
4.3.6 Alternative subsamples 
We perform two robustness tests using alternative subsamples. First, we conduct our 
analysis in the subsample that each analyst follows at least two firms and uses both DCF and PE 
models in a given year. Second, analysts usually issue multiple reports for a given firm-year. To 
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reduce the impact of repeated observations, we restrict our sample to one observation per analyst-
firm-year. In unreported tests,  we show that our main findings are qualitatively unchanged. 
4.4. The Informativeness of Analyst Valuation Model 
We predict that investors demand analysts to use DCF model in settings where cash flow 
information and discount rate information are likely to be more useful in assessing firm value. 
While the results of our hypotheses tests are consistent with this prediction, this section seeks 
corroborating evidence by examining whether the market reaction to analyst investment opinions 
justified by DCF model is stronger than that justified by PE model. Furthermore, we examine 
whether the market reaction differences are more pronounced when analysts make more cash 
flow and discount rate discussions.  
4.4.1 Stock recommendations 
Table 8 tests the informativeness of analyst valuation model by using recommendations as 
the investment opinions. Panel A in Table 8 reports the baseline analysis. The dependent variable 
CARt is the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return starting from one day before to t days 
after the report date. We examine 3 days, 30 days, half a year, and one-year horizons. In Column 
(1) to (4), we interact both Buy and Sell indicators with DCF in the regressions, but focus on the 
coefficients of Buy*DCF. This is because sell-side analysts have long been criticized to be 
optimistic for their earnings forecasts and stock recommendations (Easterwood and Nutt, 1999; 
Bradshaw et al., 2003). We expect to find that the use of DCF model increases the credibility of 
the buy recommendation. The coefficients of Buy*DCF are positive in all the four regressions, 
with a significance level at 5% in Column (1) and (2). Overall, investors react more strongly to 
the buy recommendations when they are justified by DCF model than those justified by PE model. 
The effect of valuation models on analysts’ sell stock recommendations can be mixed. If 
DCF model increases the quality and credibility of analysts’ pessimistic forecasts, then the market 
reactions would be more negative to sell recommendations based on DCF model compared with 
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those based on PE model. However, if DCF model mitigates the extent to which analysts shy 
away from pessimistic forecasts and thus leads to more forthcoming releases of pessimistic 
recommendations, then we expect sell recommendations based on DCF model elicit less negative 
market reaction compared with those based on PE model. Therefore, the net effect of valuation 
models on sell stock recommendations is an empirical question. In Column (1) to (2), the 
coefficients on Sell*DCF are positive, and significantly positive in 3 days horizon, suggesting 
that the use of DCF model attenuating the negative market reaction to analyst Sell 
recommendations. However, the coefficients of Sell*DCF turn to be negative with no 
significance in half a year and one year horizons as shown in Column (3) and (4).  
In Column (5) to (8), we interact both Buy and Sell indicators with RepCF to test whether 
investors value the stock recommendations more when they are accompanied with more cash 
flow discussions. The coefficients of Buy*RepCF are significantly positive in 3 days and 30 days 
horizons. We do not find such significance in the half a year and one-year horizons. Overall, it 
suggests that the market reactions to the analyst buy recommendations are stronger when the 
recommendations are accompanied with more cash flow discussions. 
In column (9) to (11), we test whether investors value the stock recommendations more 
when they are accompanied with more discount rate discussions. We find that the interaction of 
Buy*RepDR is positively related to the cumulated abnormal return in 3 days horizon at 1% 
significance level and 30 days horizon at 10% significance level, and with no significance in half 
a year and one-year horizons. Overall, we find some evidence that market reactions to the analyst 
buy recommendations are stronger when they are accompanied with more discount rate 
discussions.  
We also find that firm size and growth rate are significantly negatively related to the 
market-adjusted abnormal return. We have weak evidence that Beta is negatively associated with 
the CARt. This finding is consistent with the mixed findings on market beta and stock returns. For 
example, Kothari et al. (1995) find that beta is positively related to stock returns, while Fama and 
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French (1992) find no relation between beta and stock returns, and Easley et al. (2002) find a 
negative association between the two.  The coefficient on Apre12 is significantly positive because 
of the price momentum.  
Panel B in Table 8 examines whether the market reactions differences observed in Panel A 
column (1) to (4) are more pronounced when the DCF model is accompanied with more cash 
flow and discount rate discussions. To test this, we partition the sample into two subsamples 
according to the yearly median value of RepCF and RepDR and then redo the analyses in column 
(1) to (4). For simplicity, we only report the abnormal return in 3 days and one-year horizons. The 
results in other horizons are qualitatively unchanged. We find that the coefficients on Buy*DCF 
are significantly positive in the groups with high cash flow and discount rate discussions, and not 
significant in the low groups. This suggests that DCF model accompanied with more cash flow 
and discount rate analysis are more valuable to investors. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
4.4.2 Target prices 
In addition to recommendations, we also test the informativeness of analyst valuation 
model by using target price changes as the investment opinions in Table 9. Given the missing 
value of target price and its changes, our sample tested in Table 9 is reduced to 447,940 analyst 
reports. Panel A in Table 9 reports the baseline analysis. Except in 3 days horizons, the 
coefficients on Tpchg*DCF are significantly positive, suggesting that market reactions to target 
price changes justified by DCF model are stronger than those justified by PE model. We also find 
that the coefficient on TPchg*RepCF and TPchg*RepDR are significantly positively in short 
horizons, consistent with the evidence that analyst investment opinions accompanied with more 
cash flow and discount rate analysis cause stronger investors’ reactions. 
 In Table 9 Panel B, we partition the sample into two subsamples according to the yearly 
median value of RepCF and RepDR.  We find that the stronger market reactions to target price 
changes riding on DCF model are mainly restricted in groups with high cash flow and discount 
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rate discussions. The findings further demonstrate that the mere mention of DCF model is not 
useful to investors. DCF model is valuable unless it is accompanied with detailed valuation inputs 
analysis.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
5. Conclusions 
This study examines whether investor demand for value-relevant information plays a role 
in the analyst valuation process.  Our study responds to the call from Bradshaw (2011) for more 
research into how analysts perform their tasks, specifically how analysts process the information 
to justify their recommendations and target prices.  
Our analyses are based on the theoretical framework by Chen et al. (2013) who find that 
stock price moves because of the change in cash flow and discount rate news. Compared with PE 
model, DCF model incorporates explicitly cash flow and discount rate estimates. We expect that 
investor demand for value-relevant information will motivate analysts to use DCF model rather 
than PE model to value the underlying firms. In addition, we investigate whether analysts indeed 
engage in more qualitative cash flow and discount rate discussions with the increase of investor 
demand for such information. We capture investor demand for cash flow and discount rate 
information with firm earnings quality and risks respectively. 
Using a content analysis for a large sample of analyst reports, we find that analysts are 
more likely to use DCF model for firms with lower earnings quality and higher risks in response 
to investors’ stronger demand for cash flow and discount rate information for these firms. In 
addition, we find that analysts make more qualitative cash flow and discount rate discussions 
when investor demand for such information increases, indicating that analysts actually spend 
extra efforts in preparing the use of DCF model. Finally, we find that investors react more 
strongly to analyst investment opinions justified by DCF model compared with PE model. 
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Additional evidence suggests that the differences are mainly observed in the groups with high 
analyst cash flow and discount rate discussions.  
We acknowledge that this study is essentially exploratory in nature, and has its limitations. 
In particular, we do not explain the increasing trend of using DCF. In addition, there could be 
other factors that affect analysts’ choice among valuation models but are not identified in our 
studies. We leave these for future studies.  
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Appendix A: Sample selection 
   
  
Number of 
Reports 
Number of 
Firms 
Number of 
analysts 
Analysts' reports from Investext 676,651 
 
 Less: Analysts' reports without disclosure of valuation models 39,639 
 
 less: Missing value of variables 59,428 
 
 Less: If the dominant valuation models are not DCF or PE 49,699 
 
 Final sample 527,883 4,957 3,196 
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Appendix B: Classification of valuation methods 
Valuation Model Key items  
Relative models  
Earnings multiples (PE) 
P/E, PEG, P/EBITDA, EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT, EV/EBITA, EBITDA/MV, 
EV/EBIAT 
Sales multiples (PSAL) P/S, EV/Sale, MV/sale, Revenue  
Book value multiples (PB) P/B, EV/B, MV/B 
Cash flow multiples (PCF) CF/EV, P/CF, DY 
Other relative models 
MV/NI, NIBE/MV, RPE, DFE, EV/OIBDA, P/A,Gross Operating Margin, 
REP, NOA/EV, EV/R&D, Embedded value multiple, ROEg/COEg 
Absolute models  
Cash flow based (DCF) DCF, DDM, GGM, CRR, CFROI, Real Options 
Accrual based NAV, RIM, EVA 
Other absolute models 
Continuing value, Technology value, Warranted equity model, ARR, Return 
on embedded value, Return on Capital Employed, Residual Earnings 
 
Appendix C: Algorithms to identify valuation models from analyst reports  
We notice that analyst usually mention multiple valuation models in each of their research reports. To 
identify the dominant models in a report, within the sentences that contain the key valuation items as 
defined in Appendix B, we search for two sets of keywords that suggest the analyst is relying on a specific 
model to justify the stock recommendation and the target price: 
 
A. The first set of keywords relates to the research outputs of target price and recommendation 
which includes the following keywords: price target, target price, PT, recommend, and 
recommendation.  
B. The second set of keywords relates to an analyst’s action of applying a specific valuation model 
to justify target price and recommendation, including use, using, based, basing, derive, derived, 
rating, and rate. 
 
If a report satisfies either Algorithm A or B above, the valuation models mentioned in these sentences 
would be classified as dominant models. In cases where the above coding scheme does not reveal any 
dominant model, we examine the frequency of valuation model occurrence in the reports. The valuation 
models with frequency of at least 3/4 of the most frequently used models in the report are defined as 
dominant models. 
 
We set the distance between the accounting terms (such as P/E, EPS) and the keyword lists (such as target 
price, base, using) in Algorithm A and B to be within 30 words. For example, there are 9 words between 
the keyword list "target price" and the accounting term "BPS" below. 
 
“Our target price through April 2007 is ¥3,155, based on our average BPS estimate for FY2006 and 
FY2007, and a multiple of 1.4x, the sector average.” 
 
Appendix D:  Variable definitions 
Variable Definition and data source 
Valuation models 
DCF 
Dummy equals to one if analysts use DCF model as the dominant valuation model, and 
zero if the dominant valuation model is PE only. 
PureDCF 
Dummy equals to one if analysts only use DCF model as the dominant valuation model, 
and zero if the dominant valuation model is PE only. 
DCF_PCF 
Dummy equals to one if the dominant valuation model is DCF and zero if the dominant 
model is PCF.  
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Absolute 
Dummy equals to one if the dominant valuation model is absolute model and zero if the 
dominant model is relative model. 
Demand for cash flow information 
Earnmgmt Abnormal accruals based on Modified Jones Model in year t-1 
Accrual 
Absolute difference between net income before extraordinary items and operating cash 
flows divided by total assets in year t-1 
Demand for risk information 
CF_std 
Five years standard deviation of quarterly operating cash flows scaled by total assets 
before analyst report date 
Loss An indicator of negative earnings. 
Retstd12 12 months Standard deviation of daily stock return before analyst report date. 
Analyst cash flow and discount rate Discussion 
RepCFdum 
Dummy equals to one if analysts make cash flow keywords discussions and zero if 
analysts do not mention any cash flow keywords 
RepCF The number of cash flow keywords discussed by analysts in their reports  
RepDRdum 
Dummy equals to one if analysts make discount rate keywords discussions and zero if 
analysts do not mention any discount rate keywords 
RepDR The number of discount rate keywords discussed by analysts in their reports  
Analyst investment opinions and market reactions 
CARt 
Market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return starting one day before to 3 days, 30 days, 
183 days and 365 days after the issuance of an analyst report 
Buy Dummy equals to one if analyst issue an buy recommendation and zero otherwise 
Sell Dummy equals to one if analyst issue an sell recommendation and zero otherwise 
TPchg 
change of analyst target price forecast scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the 
year 
Control variables 
EPU The proxy for economic policy uncertainty from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016). 
Sentiment the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index 
Logmv The logarithm of firm market value in year t-1. 
Salesgrowth Year t - 1 revenues less year t - 2 revenues scaled by year t - 2 revenues 
Beta Market beta calculated from CAPM model 
Arpre12 12-month abnormal return before the issue of an analyst’ report. 
Repwords The logarithm of the total number of analyst report words. 
Indexpert 
The logarithm of the number of firms in a two-digit SIC industry covered by the analyst 
in year t 
Firmex The number of years an analyst has been following a firm 
CFA Dummy equals to one if an analyst has a CFA designation, and zero otherwise 
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Figure 1 The distribution of all the valuation models used by analysts over years 
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Table 1  
Final Sample Distribution  
Panel A describes the yearly distribution of the number of firms, analysts and analyst reports, the percent of 
analyst reports using DCF model, the average number of cash flow and discount rate discussions in each 
analyst report and the mean value of buy, sell and Tpchg. Panel B describes the use of DCF model by 
industry (Fama French 12 Industry) 
Panel A Distributions by year 
Year N.Firm N.Analyst 
Analyst Report 
Buy Sell Tpchg 
N.Rep 
% 
DCF 
Avg_ 
RepCF 
Avg_ 
RepDR 
1997 1,245 470 3,791 3.03 2.35 0.66 0.72 0.01 0.03 
1998 1,569 568 7,604 2.71 1.91 0.55 0.67 0.02 0.00 
1999 1,583 626 11,746 3.35 1.88 0.54 0.67 0.01 0.02 
2000 1,895 829 23,332 4.65 1.67 0.64 0.76 0.00 0.01 
2001 1,981 906 31,826 6.04 1.55 0.63 0.69 0.01 -0.02 
2002 1,977 926 35,951 10.98 1.93 0.74 0.57 0.07 -0.03 
2003 1,803 822 32,887 17.08 2.78 1.13 0.43 0.12 0.02 
2004 1,833 740 37,163 20.07 2.68 1.31 0.45 0.11 0.02 
2005 1,970 715 38,447 21.21 2.88 1.47 0.46 0.10 0.02 
2006 1,960 621 31,397 19.22 3.03 1.22 0.48 0.09 0.01 
2007 2,038 629 32,710 21.59 3.19 1.37 0.50 0.09 0.01 
2008 1,960 617 30,853 25.70 3.94 1.57 0.48 0.07 -0.06 
2009 1,703 533 26,324 26.87 4.44 1.62 0.46 0.08 0.04 
2010 1,720 576 29,737 24.27 4.39 1.54 0.51 0.05 0.03 
2011 1,698 571 31,183 25.92 4.16 1.53 0.53 0.05 0.02 
2012 1,646 573 30,892 26.88 4.46 1.51 0.51 0.06 0.01 
2013 1,659 539 29,041 25.37 4.39 1.52 0.48 0.07 0.04 
2014 1,697 537 32,438 22.73 3.73 1.32 0.51 0.05 0.02 
2015 1,740 527 30,561 21.16 3.51 1.20 0.50 0.06 0.00 
Mean 1,772 649 27,783 19.29 3.21 1.24 0.52 0.07 0.01 
Panel B Use of DCF model by Industry  
  Analyst Reports Firm Analyst 
Industry 
Number 
% 
using 
DCF 
Number 
% 
using 
DCF 
Number 
% 
using 
DCF 
Business Equipment 110,652 19.98 1,183 53.76 1,081 47.64 
Chemicals and Allied Products 17,840 13.74 102 71.57 183 41.53 
Consumer Durables 9,507 18.9 86 50 219 41.10 
Consumer NonDurables 26,027 24.28 200 65 318 50 
Finance 76,004 16.14 820 46.59 676 42.90 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 60,725 24.05 615 55.12 406 51.97 
Manufacturing 46,226 9.34 433 45.50 581 39.41 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 26,371 20.66 250 65.60 280 53.21 
Other 57,062 19.94 692 53.47 983 48.12 
Telephone and Television Transmission 20,095 43.35 218 78.90 275 69.45 
Utilities 16,542 26.51 112 85.71 157 56.05 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services  60,832 13.18 493 51.12 732 38.25 
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Table 2 Summary statistics and Pearson Correlations 
Panel A Summary statistics (In total 527,883 reports, with 101,809reports using DCF model) 
Variables Mean Median SD Min Max 
Valuation models         
DCF 0.193 0 0.395 0 1 
Market reactions 
    CAR3 -1.806 -1.613 7.096 -24.45 18.09 
CAR30 -8.369 -6.804 16.75 -58.35 31.11 
CAR183 -27.26 -23.88 41.09 -98.56 70.73 
CAR365 -34.69 -37.02 51.68 -99.97 104.5 
Demand for cash flow information 
  Earnmgmt 0.062 0.036 0.081 0.001 0.485 
Accrual 0.071 0.052 0.072 0.001 0.449 
Demand for discount rate information 
  CF_std 0.058 0.047 0.049 0.005 0.337 
Loss 0.179 0 0.384 0 1 
Retstd12 2.386 2.009 1.375 0.776 7.365 
Analyst cash flow and discount rate discussions 
 RepCFdum 0.628 1 0.483 0 1 
RepCF 3.214 2 4.436 0 23 
RepDRdum 0.493 0 0.5 0 1 
RepDR 1.24 0 2.127 0 12 
Other variables 
    EPU 110.7 101 35.7 57.56 197.9 
Logmv 8.385 8.307 1.705 4.579 12.31 
Salesgrowth 20.79 10.29 47.37 -47.42 334.4 
Beta 1.032 0.983 0.518 0.081 2.46 
Arpre12 -30.87 -30.56 54.96 -99.96 126.4 
Repwords 7.3 7.41 0.737 5.347 8.779 
Indexpert 2.07 2.197 0.749 0.693 3.555 
Firmexp 2.306 1.51 2.395 0 11.28 
Buy 0.523 1 0.499 0 1 
CFA 0.228 0 0.42 0 1 
Panel B Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1)DCF 
       (2) Earnmgmt 0.032*** 
      (3)Accrual 0.043*** 0.644*** 
     (4)CF_std 0.052*** 0.407*** 0.304*** 
    (5)Loss 0.052*** 0.322*** 0.296*** 0.353*** 
   (6)Retstd12 -0.046*** 0.368*** 0.296*** 0.379*** 0.420*** 
  (7)RepCF 0.287*** -0.00100 0.057*** -0.021*** 0.014*** -0.060*** 
 (8)RepDR 0.502*** 0.014*** 0.022*** 0.014*** 0.034*** -0.045*** 0.575*** 
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Table 3 
The Determinants of DCF model: Investor demand for cash flow and discount rate information 
This table reports the logistic regression on investor demand for using DCF model. The dependent variable 
is DCF which equals to one if analysts mention DCF as dominant valuation model, and zero if analysts 
only use PE as the dominant valuation model. We use Earnmgmt and Accrual (CF_std) to capture investor 
demand for cash flow information, and use firm risk variables like CF_std, Loss, and Retstd12 to capture 
investor demand for discount rate information. In the parentheses below coefficient estimates are robust t-
statistics based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. All variables are defined in Table 1. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Earnmgmt 1.495*** 
    
0.718*** 
 
(5.62) 
    
(2.96) 
Accrual 
 
1.335*** 
   
0.080 
  
(4.55) 
   
(0.27) 
CF_std 
  
3.742*** 
  
2.879*** 
   
(6.77) 
  
(5.73) 
Loss 
   
0.406*** 
 
0.301*** 
    
(4.99) 
 
(4.18) 
Retstd12 
    
0.090*** 0.023 
     
(2.80) (0.87) 
Logmv -0.001 -0.000 0.011 0.018 0.012 0.037** 
 
(-0.06) (-0.02) (0.66) (1.03) (0.65) (1.96) 
Salesgrowth 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 
(4.88) (6.09) (4.46) (5.60) (6.24) (3.46) 
Beta -0.165* -0.158* -0.171** -0.209** -0.227*** -0.253*** 
 
(-1.95) (-1.83) (-2.03) (-2.54) (-2.61) (-3.04) 
Arpre12 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(-0.70) (-0.67) (-1.03) (-0.59) (-0.26) (-0.99) 
Repwords 0.417*** 0.417*** 0.418*** 0.413*** 0.415*** 0.415*** 
 
(7.03) (7.02) (7.03) (7.00) (6.97) (6.99) 
Indexpert -0.079* -0.085** -0.081* -0.081* -0.077* -0.083** 
 
(-1.84) (-1.99) (-1.91) (-1.93) (-1.80) (-1.97) 
Firmexp -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.052*** -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.052*** 
 
(-5.71) (-5.82) (-5.51) (-5.92) (-5.87) (-5.53) 
Buy 0.061* 0.068** 0.058* 0.058* 0.067** 0.052 
 
(1.88) (2.11) (1.77) (1.79) (2.09) (1.60) 
CFA -0.087 -0.085 -0.084 -0.083 -0.085 -0.082 
 
(-1.49) (-1.44) (-1.42) (-1.41) (-1.45) (-1.39) 
Constant -6.134*** -6.117*** -6.355*** -6.136*** -6.291*** -6.533*** 
 
(-10.08) (-9.98) (-10.54) (-10.03) (-10.36) (-10.70) 
Year, Bank, 
 And Industry  
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883 
Pseudo R-squared 0.133 0.133 0.135 0.134 0.132 0.137 
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Table 4 
Investor demand for value-relevant information and Analysts’ discussion of cash flow and discount 
rate information 
This table reports ols regression results on the impact of investor demand for information on analysts’ 
discussion of cash flow and discount rate information. Column (1) to (2) tests the impact of firm earnings 
quality on the number of analyst cash flow discussions in their reports. The dependent variables are RepCF. 
Column (3) to (5) tests the impact of firm risks on the number of analyst discount rate discussions in their 
reports. The dependent variables are RepDR. In the parentheses below coefficient estimates are robust t-
statistics adjusted for firm and year clustering. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. All variables are defined in Table 1. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  RepCF RepCF RepDR RepDR RepDR 
Earnmgmt 
 
0.781** 
    (2.06) 
    Accrual 
 
1.673*** 
   
  
(4.97) 
   CF_std 
  
1.464*** 
  
   
(3.78) 
  Loss 
   
0.236*** 
 
    
(5.33) 
 Retstd12 
    
0.036** 
     
(2.13) 
Logmv -0.101*** -0.094*** -0.009 -0.001 -0.008 
 
(-4.88) (-4.49) (-1.12) (-0.17) (-0.83) 
Salesgrowth 0.000 0.001 0.001** 0.001** 0.001*** 
 
(0.40) (0.86) (2.07) (2.14) (2.79) 
Beta -0.687*** -0.696*** -0.036 -0.059* -0.058 
 
(-12.44) (-12.64) (-1.14) (-1.91) (-1.56) 
Arpre12 0.001** 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(2.50) (2.47) (0.55) (0.76) (0.88) 
Repwords 2.041*** 2.040*** 0.797*** 0.795*** 0.797*** 
 
(17.74) (17.75) (26.43) (26.50) (26.32) 
Indexpert -0.042 -0.049 -0.071** -0.071** -0.069** 
 
(-0.64) (-0.76) (-2.27) (-2.32) (-2.21) 
Firmexp -0.022 -0.022 -0.017** -0.019*** -0.019** 
 
(-1.03) (-1.02) (-2.40) (-2.58) (-2.56) 
Buy 0.245*** 0.250*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.066*** 
 
(7.04) (7.13) (3.53) (3.47) (3.64) 
CFA 0.077 0.080 -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 
 
(0.65) (0.68) (-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.16) 
Constant -11.792*** -11.880*** -4.908*** -4.856*** -4.900*** 
 
(-11.00) (-11.11) (-12.33) (-12.20) (-12.29) 
Year, Bank,  
Industry FE 
Yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883 
R-squared 0.212 0.212 0.144 0.144 0.143 
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Table 5 
Cross-sectional analyses on investor demand for using DCF model  
Panel A reports the impact of economic policy uncertainty on investor demand for DCF valuation model. The dependent variables in column (1) to (5) are DCF 
which equals to one if the dominant valuation model used by an analyst in the report is DCF model, and zero otherwise. The dependent variables in column (6) to 
(7) (column (8) to (9)) are the number of cash flow (discount rate) keywords talked by analysts in their reports. EPU is the proxy for economic policy uncertainty 
from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016). Panel B reports the impact of market sentiment on investor demand for DCF model. Sentiment is the university of 
michigan consumer sentiment index. We use Earnmgmt and Accrual to capture investor demand for cash flow information, and use firm risk variables like 
CF_std, Loss, and Retstd12 to capture investor demand for discount rate information. Column (1) to (5) tests the impact of EPU (Sentiment) on the positive 
relation between investor demand and the tendency to use DCF model. Column (6) to (10) tests the impact of EPU (Sentiment) on the positive relation between 
investor demand and the number of analyst cash flow and discount rate discussions in their reports. From column (1) to (5) and (6) to (10) Trait stands for 
Earnmgmt, Accrual, CF_std, Loss, and Retstd12 respectively. In the parentheses below coefficient estimates are robust t-statistics based on standard errors 
adjusted for firm and year clustering. For simplicity, control variables are included but not reported in the table. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined in Table 1. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A Economic policy uncertainty and investor demand for using DCF model 
  
Dependent 
 variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
DCF DCF DCF DCF DCF 
 
RepCF RepCF RepDR RepDR RepDR 
 Demand for cash flow  Demand for discount rate   Demand for cash flow  Demand for discount rate  
Trait Earnmgmt Accrual CF_std Loss Retstd12  Earnmgmt Accrual CF_std Loss Retstd12 
EPU 0.003*** 0.003** 0.002 0.004*** 0.000  0.009*** 0.009*** 0.001 0.002** -0.000 
 
(2.58) (2.34) (1.31) (2.76) (0.09)  (6.12) (5.79) (1.10) (2.53) (-0.34) 
Trait -1.685* -0.944 -1.501 -0.090 -0.374***  -3.176** -1.897* -1.575 -0.052 -0.186*** 
 
(-1.85) (-1.32) (-0.81) (-0.39) (-3.44)  (-2.06) (-1.68) (-1.63) (-0.42) (-3.69) 
EPU*Trait 0.025*** 0.018*** 0.045*** 0.004** 0.002***  0.035** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.002** 0.001*** 
 
(2.87) (2.67) (2.76) (2.10) (2.83)  (2.45) (3.06) (2.71) (1.97) (2.84) 
Controls Yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE no no no no no  no no no no no 
Bank, Industry FE Yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883  527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883 
Pseudo R-squared 0.099 0.098 0.101 0.100 0.100  0.199 0.199 0.133 0.133 0.133 
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Panel B Market sentiment and investor demand for using DCF model 
  
Dependent 
 variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
DCF DCF DCF DCF DCF 
 
RepCF RepCF RepDR RepDR RepDR 
 Demand for cash flow  Demand for discount rate   Demand for cash flow  Demand for discount rate  
Trait Earnmgmt Accrual CF_std Loss Retstd12  Earnmgmt Accrual CF_std Loss Retstd12 
Sentiment -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.017***  -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.007** 
 
(-5.56) (-5.41) (-5.38) (-6.26) (-2.88)  (-5.63) (-5.96) (-3.96) (-6.84) (-2.17) 
Trait 5.691** 3.303 10.839** 0.807* 0.287*  12.525*** 10.700*** 8.842*** 0.931*** 0.225** 
 
(2.37) (1.53) (2.49) (1.85) (1.72)  (5.85) (5.23) (3.92) (4.48) (2.43) 
Sentiment*Trait -0.053** -0.026 -0.085* -0.005 -0.005**  -0.136*** -0.108*** -0.086*** -0.008*** -0.003** 
 
(-1.97) (-1.05) (-1.69) (-0.92) (-2.16)  (-6.01) (-4.81) (-3.55) (-3.57) (-2.53) 
Controls Yes yes yes Yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE no no no no no  no no no no no 
Bank, Industry FE Yes yes yes Yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883  527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883 
Pseudo R-squared 0.110 0.110 0.113 0.111 0.110  0.205 0.205 0.138 0.138 0.137 
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Table 6 
Considering other valuation models used by analysts  
Panel A reports all the major valuation models used by analysts. We classify the models into two broad 
categories: absolute models and relative models. In Panel A, we report the models with an average of at 
least 3% used by analysts in their reports. Absolute models include DCF and NAV. Relative models 
include PE, PB, PSAL and PCF. Panel B reports the determinants of using absolute models against relative 
models. The dependent variable Absolute is an indicator, which equals to one if the dominant valuation 
model is absolute model and zero if the dominant model is relative model. We use Earnmgmt and Accrual 
(CF_std) to capture investor demand for cash flow information, and use firm risk variables CF_std, Loss, 
and Retstd12 to capture investor demand for discount rate information. Panel C reports the determinants of 
using DCF against PCF model. The dependent variable is DCF_PCF, which equals to one if the dominant 
valuation model is DCF and zero if the dominant model is PCF. Control variables are the same as in Table 
3. For brevity, we do not report them. The definitions of other variables are in Appendix D. In the 
parentheses below coefficient estimates are robust t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for firm and 
year clustering. . *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. 
 
Panel A Valuation models distributions over the years 
 
  Absolute Model (%)   Relative Model (%) 
Year 
N. 
(Reports) 
Abs 
_total 
DCF NAV  
Rel_ 
total 
PE PB PSAL PCF 
1997 3,903 4.69 2.95 1.90  95.31 94.18 1.90 1.82 1.00 
1998 7,932 4.87 2.60 2.46  95.13 93.27 1.20 3.74 0.87 
1999 12,121 4.76 3.24 1.64  95.24 93.66 1.11 3.10 1.11 
2000 24,587 5.93 4.41 1.47  94.07 90.48 0.90 3.81 0.88 
2001 33,191 7.56 5.79 1.50  92.44 90.09 1.57 3.37 0.98 
2002 37,810 12.26 10.44 1.67  87.74 84.64 2.78 2.90 2.90 
2003 34,929 18.51 16.08 2.53  81.49 78.07 4.10 2.52 5.33 
2004 39,968 21.58 18.66 3.08  78.42 74.32 3.81 3.20 3.28 
2005 41,328 22.75 19.73 3.52  77.25 73.30 4.39 3.32 3.68 
2006 34,128 20.21 17.68 3.21  79.79 74.31 3.20 2.71 3.29 
2007 35,778 22.88 19.74 4.08  77.12 71.69 4.44 2.95 3.94 
2008 34,837 27.18 22.76 5.56  72.82 65.80 6.39 3.69 3.55 
2009 30,118 30.48 23.48 8.37  69.52 63.92 6.01 3.68 3.17 
2010 32,971 26.20 21.89 5.14  73.80 68.31 5.57 3.06 3.75 
2011 35,279 27.08 22.91 4.44  72.92 65.48 5.64 2.91 4.47 
2012 35,206 28.50 23.58 4.77  71.50 64.16 5.86 3.28 4.24 
2013 32,978 27.28 22.34 4.76  72.72 65.72 5.75 3.18 5.06 
2014 36,387 25.40 20.26 4.63  74.60 68.89 4.93 2.41 4.65 
2015 34,321 23.89 18.84 4.61  76.11 70.20 4.94 2.41 5.33 
Total/Mean 577,772 21.23 19.29 3.65  80.95 76.34 3.92 3.06 3.24 
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Panel B Absolute vs Relative Models (total observations= 577,772, including 122,647using Absolute 
models and 457,934 using relative models) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Earnmgmt 
 
1.263*** 
    
0.344 
(5.00) 
    
(1.43) 
Accrual 
 
1.406*** 
   
0.612** 
  
(4.68) 
   
(2.41) 
CF_std 
  
2.901*** 
  
2.212*** 
   
(5.59) 
  
(4.70) 
Loss 
   
0.340*** 
 
0.269*** 
    
(4.15) 
 
(3.65) 
Retstd12 
    
0.040 -0.016 
     
(1.46) (-0.70) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year,Bank, Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 577,772 577,772 577,772 577,772 577,772 577,772 
Pseudo  
R-squared 
0.126 0.126 0.127 0.126 0.125 0.128 
 
Panel C DCF vs PCF Models (total observations= 122,610, including 101,809 using DCF model and 
20,801using PCF model)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Earnmgmt 
 
0.218 
    
-0.228 
(0.50) 
    
(-0.54) 
Accrual 
 
0.111 
   
-0.520 
  
(0.22) 
   
(-0.99) 
CF_std 
  
2.972*** 
  
2.694*** 
   
(3.86) 
  
(3.50) 
Loss 
   
0.298*** 
 
0.238*** 
    
(3.36) 
 
(2.64) 
Retstd12 
    
0.129*** 0.093** 
     
(3.32) (2.51) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year,Bank, Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 122,610 122,610 122,610 122,610 122,610 122,610 
Pseudo  
R-squared 
0.079 0.079 0.081 0.080 0.081 0.083 
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Table 7 
Alternative measurement of analyst cash flow and discount rate discussions 
We redefine analyst cash flow and discount rate discussions by ranking RepCF (RepDR) by bank year in 
quintiles. We have two new measurements: RepCF5d, the rank of RepCF by bank year, range from 1 to 5, 
and RepDR5d, the rank of RepDR by bank year, range from 1 to 5. We then repeat the analyses in table 4 
but with tobit regressions. Control variables are the same as in Table 3. For brevity, we do not report them. 
The definitions of other variables are provided in Appendix D. In the parentheses below coefficient 
estimates are robust t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. . *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
RepCF5d RepCF5d RepDR5d RepDR5d RepDR5d 
Earnmgmt 
 
0.781*** 
    (2.83) 
    Accrual 
 
2.039*** 
   
  
(7.19) 
   CF_std 
  
6.611*** 
  
   
(5.85) 
  Loss 
   
1.130*** 
 
    
(8.19) 
 Retstd12 
    
0.063 
     
(1.33) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Year,Bank, 
Industry FE 
yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883 
Pseudo R-squared 0.066 0.067 0.048 0.049 0.048 
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Table 8 The informativeness of valuation models: Recommendations 
This table reports the economic consequences of using different valuation models. The dependent variable CARt is the cumulated abnormal return starting from 
one day before to t days after the report date. Buy (Sell) is an indicator of analyst buy (sell) recommendations. DCF equals to one if the dominant valuation model 
in an analyst report is DCF model, and zero otherwise. RepCF and RepDR is the number of cash flow and discount rates keywords discussed by analysts in their 
reports respectively.  Panel A reports the baseline analysis. Panel B examines whether the market reactions differences observed in Panel A column (1) to (4) are 
more pronounced when the DCF model is accompanied with more cash flow and discount rate discussions.  The definitions of other variables are provided in 
Appendix D. In the parentheses below coefficient estimates are robust t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A Baseline analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  CAR3 CAR30 CAR183 CAR365 CAR3 CAR30 CAR183 CAR365 CAR3 CAR30 CAR183 CAR365 
Buy 0.435*** -0.224 -2.344*** -3.347*** 0.398*** -0.285 -2.454*** -3.489*** 0.426*** -0.215 -2.275*** -3.240*** 
 
(14.34) (-1.43) (-4.12) (-4.19) (10.74) (-1.57) (-3.58) (-3.59) (13.25) (-1.25) (-3.50) (-3.59) 
Sell -0.522*** -0.401 0.284 0.885 -0.355*** -0.160 0.436 0.926 -0.450*** -0.249 0.538 1.022 
 
(-7.98) (-1.34) (0.26) (0.57) (-6.90) (-0.53) (0.40) (0.59) (-8.41) (-0.82) (0.47) (0.64) 
DCF -0.118** -0.421** -0.581 -0.676 
        
 
(-2.17) (-2.13) (-0.98) (-0.83) 
        Buy*DCF 0.157** 0.530** 0.746 0.824 
        
 
(2.54) (2.39) (1.22) (1.13) 
        Sell*DCF 0.332*** 0.411 -0.007 -0.657 
        
 
(3.03) (1.10) (-0.01) (-0.51) 
        RepCF 
    
0.004 0.004 0.065 0.091 
    
     
(0.61) (0.24) (1.35) (1.27) 
    Buy*RepCF 
    
0.020*** 0.048** 0.071 0.083 
    
     
(3.17) (2.29) (0.99) (0.85) 
    Sell*RepCF 
    
-0.032* -0.051 -0.046 -0.051 
    
     
(-1.78) (-1.51) (-0.63) (-0.51) 
    RepDR 
        
-0.012 -0.068*** -0.077 -0.062 
         
(-1.30) (-2.59) (-0.99) (-0.65) 
Buy*RepDR 
        
0.032*** 0.076* 0.062 0.044 
         
(3.84) (1.85) (0.47) (0.28) 
Sell*RepDR 
        
-0.002 -0.052 -0.197 -0.209 
         
(-0.10) (-0.75) (-1.02) (-1.04) 
Logmv -0.162*** -1.077*** -3.704*** -5.018*** -0.160*** -1.073*** -3.692*** -5.002*** -0.162*** -1.076*** -3.704*** -5.017*** 
 
(-4.93) (-6.84) (-6.55) (-6.04) (-4.90) (-6.85) (-6.56) (-6.05) (-4.91) (-6.84) (-6.55) (-6.04) 
Salesgrowth -0.003*** -0.007** -0.031** -0.052*** -0.003*** -0.007** -0.031** -0.053*** -0.003*** -0.007** -0.030** -0.052*** 
 
(-3.65) (-2.05) (-2.57) (-3.02) (-3.68) (-2.07) (-2.57) (-3.03) (-3.66) (-2.05) (-2.56) (-3.01) 
Beta -0.341* -1.466** -1.382 -0.482 -0.332* -1.444** -1.309 -0.383 -0.341* -1.464** -1.378 -0.475 
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(-1.95) (-2.39) (-0.78) (-0.19) (-1.90) (-2.36) (-0.74) (-0.16) (-1.94) (-2.39) (-0.78) (-0.19) 
Arpre12 0.037*** 0.154*** 0.449*** 0.533*** 0.037*** 0.154*** 0.449*** 0.533*** 0.037*** 0.154*** 0.449*** 0.533*** 
 
(18.92) (21.66) (23.56) (18.72) (18.93) (21.66) (23.53) (18.70) (18.93) (21.67) (23.57) (18.72) 
Repwords 0.035 -0.008 -0.193 -0.053 0.005 -0.075 -0.413 -0.345 0.029 0.008 -0.161 -0.029 
 
(1.07) (-0.09) (-0.68) (-0.11) (0.17) (-0.89) (-1.37) (-0.65) (0.90) (0.09) (-0.57) (-0.06) 
Indexpert -0.075* -0.423*** -0.817** -0.664 -0.075* -0.424*** -0.814** -0.659 -0.074* -0.425*** -0.820** -0.666 
 
(-1.81) (-2.64) (-2.01) (-1.18) (-1.82) (-2.64) (-2.01) (-1.17) (-1.81) (-2.65) (-2.02) (-1.18) 
Firmexp -0.000 0.033 0.148** 0.203** -0.000 0.034 0.151** 0.208** -0.000 0.033 0.148** 0.204** 
 
(-0.03) (1.05) (1.98) (2.21) (-0.02) (1.09) (2.03) (2.30) (-0.03) (1.05) (1.99) (2.25) 
CFA 0.052 0.051 0.180 0.025 0.054 0.053 0.175 0.016 0.053 0.053 0.180 0.022 
 
(1.28) (0.33) (0.46) (0.05) (1.34) (0.34) (0.45) (0.03) (1.33) (0.35) (0.46) (0.04) 
Constant 1.267*** 8.942*** 28.473*** 26.140*** 1.448*** 9.323*** 29.743*** 27.829*** 1.300*** 8.815*** 28.194*** 25.879*** 
 
(3.34) (5.33) (4.46) (2.80) (3.82) (5.28) (4.41) (2.78) (3.56) (5.28) (4.39) (2.75) 
Year, Bank, 
Industry FE 
yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883 527,883 
R-squared 0.092 0.307 0.457 0.443 0.092 0.307 0.457 0.443 0.092 0.307 0.457 0.443 
 
Panel B Subsamples where analysts make high and low cash flow and discount rate discussions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
CAR3 CAR3 CAR3 CAR3 CAR365 CAR365 CAR365 CAR365 
 
RepCF 
 
RepDR 
 
RepCF 
 
RepDR 
  high low high low high low high low 
Buy 0.495*** 0.338*** 0.428*** 0.446*** -4.632*** -1.155*** -4.382*** -1.710*** 
 
(10.94) (7.67) (11.39) (10.13) (-5.08) (-2.58) (-4.23) (-4.30) 
Sell -0.721*** -0.313*** -0.547*** -0.462*** 1.505 1.088 0.952 1.338 
 
(-6.62) (-4.06) (-6.16) (-5.95) (0.65) (1.12) (0.43) (1.14) 
DCF -0.115** -0.128 -0.118** -0.151 -1.272 -0.826 -1.444 1.228 
 
(-2.06) (-0.98) (-2.36) (-0.73) (-1.19) (-0.81) (-1.46) (0.66) 
Buy*DCF 0.137* 0.126 0.188*** -0.034 1.848** 0.215 2.180** -0.836 
 
(1.85) (0.76) (2.92) (-0.17) (2.19) (0.21) (2.23) (-0.45) 
Sell*DCF 0.425*** 0.464 0.353*** 0.191 -1.006 -1.521 -0.765 -3.335 
 
(3.75) (1.59) (3.27) (0.34) (-0.57) (-0.88) (-0.41) (-1.07) 
Controls yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year,Bank, Industry FE yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes 
High-Low Diff (P-value)           0.9166            0.2951             0.0075              0.0072 
Observations 351,287 176,596 375,578 152,305 351,287 176,596 375,578 152,305 
R-squared 0.088 0.103 0.091 0.098 0.417 0.509 0.421 0.511 
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Table 9 The informativeness of valuation models: Target price changes 
This table uses analyst target price changes to test the informativeness of valuation models. We then repeat the analyses in Table 9. The dependent variable CARt 
is the cumulated abnormal return starting from one day before to t days after the report date. TPchg is the change of analyst target price forecast scaled by the 
stock price at the beginning of the year. DCF equals to one if the dominant valuation model in an analyst report is DCF model, and zero otherwise. RepCF and 
RepDR is the number of cash flow and discount rates keywords discussed by analysts in their reports respectively.  Panel A reports the baseline analysis. Panel B 
examines whether the market reactions differences observed in Panel A column (1) to (4) are more pronounced when the DCF model is accompanied with more 
cash flow and discount rate discussions.  The definitions of other variables are provided in Appendix D. In the parentheses below coefficient estimates are robust 
t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A Baseline analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  CAR3 CAR30 CAR183 CAR365 CAR3 CAR30 CAR183 CAR365 CAR3 CAR30 CAR183 CAR365 
TPchg 5.161*** 2.057** -13.738*** -19.337*** 4.963*** 2.102** -12.910*** -18.037*** 5.061*** 2.009** -13.603*** -19.029*** 
 
(9.72) (2.35) (-10.13) (-7.87) (10.07) (2.29) (-9.60) (-7.53) (10.16) (2.43) (-9.36) (-7.73) 
DCF 0.009 -0.095 -0.176 -0.274 
        
 
(0.20) (-0.62) (-0.46) (-0.49) 
        TPchg*DCF 0.673 1.393* 3.143** 4.748*** 
        
 
(1.48) (1.79) (2.19) (2.60) 
        RepCF 
    
0.008 0.021 0.093** 0.143** 
    
     
(1.54) (1.29) (1.99) (2.06) 
    TPchg*RepCF 
    
0.099** 0.069 -0.067 -0.116 
    
     
(2.19) (0.76) (-0.34) (-0.39) 
    RepDR 
        
-0.005 -0.051* -0.105** -0.092 
         
(-0.54) (-1.92) (-1.99) (-1.41) 
TPchg*RepDR 
        
0.177*** 0.253** 0.387 0.499 
         
(3.05) (2.19) (1.43) (1.28) 
Controls yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year, Bank, 
Industry FE 
yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 447,940 447,940 447,940 447,940 447,940 447,940 447,940 447,940 447,940 447,940 447,940 447,940 
R-squared 0.106 0.316 0.471 0.460 0.106 0.316 0.471 0.460 0.106 0.316 0.471 0.460 
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Panel B Subsamples where analysts make high and low cash flow and discount rate discussions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
CAR3 CAR3 CAR3 CAR3 CAR365 CAR365 CAR365 CAR365 
 
RepCF 
 
RepDR 
 
RepCF 
 
RepDR 
   high low High low high low high low 
TPchg 5.351*** 4.766*** 4.861*** 5.800*** -20.425*** -16.750*** -20.895*** -16.374*** 
 
(7.45) (10.45) (7.98) (10.04) (-8.05) (-5.87) (-8.37) (-5.08) 
DCF 0.015 -0.003 0.025 -0.024 -0.360 -0.723 -0.352 0.818 
 
(0.25) (-0.04) (0.57) (-0.15) (-0.50) (-0.90) (-0.58) (0.50) 
TPchg*DCF 0.915 -0.558 1.169** -2.716* 6.258*** 2.248 7.040*** 0.302 
 
(1.44) (-0.82) (1.98) (-1.88) (2.96) (1.02) (3.25) (0.06) 
Controls  yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year, Bank, Industry FE yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes 
High-Low Diff (P-value)         0.0049        0.0001       0.1156          0.1561 
Observations 301,225 146,715 323,326 124,614 301,225 146,715 323,326 124,614 
R-squared 0.102 0.118 0.104 0.115 0.434 0.522 0.440 0.520 
 
